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ABSTRACT
There is increasing scholarly attention to judicial enforcement
of the right to health, but too often it extrapolates general lessons
from one country or region. The impacts of judicial enforcement
depend largely on the reasons people turn to courts, the nature of
judicial decisions, and the extent to which courts can open political
opportunity structures for greater equity and transparency.
Drawing on case studies from five countries in the region, the
Article argues that the experience of constitutionalization and
judicial enforcement of the right to health in Latin America shows
a number of lessons and challenges. Against backdrops of extreme
social inequality, with poor responsiveness from the executive and
legislative branches of government, as well as chronic regulatory
failures within health systems, it is unsurprising that people take
advantage of the favorable opportunity structures that exist in
many courts. Nevertheless, contrary to widespread thinking, easy
access to justice, combined with individual decisions can promote
queue jumping and potentially exacerbate inequities in health
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systems. The example of a mega-judgment in Colombia shows
both that under certain circumstances apex courts can play
important roles in catalyzing action by political branches but also
suggests that there are significant limitations of transformative
constitutionalism, at least in the health field.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The history of how health-related rights have evolved in Latin
America is inextricably linked to contestation over boundaries
between private morality and public policy, between individual
and social responsibility for health, and between the role of the
state and markets. In a region of profound social inequalities1 that
are deeply reflected in social determinants of health, as well as
health outcomes, health systems have been sites of social
contestation, from the incorporation of health and social
protections for workers in the wake of enormous immigration to
movements for social medicine to market-based liberalization and
reforms. Moreover, since colonial times, when health was largely
conceived of as charity organized by religious institutions, there
has remained a deeply embedded discourse of health conditions as
divine punishment for “sin,”, which is most acutely evidenced in
relation to sexual and reproductive health.2 Indeed, the right to
health is perhaps the most radical of social rights because it
challenges what is taken for granted as “natural.”3
The contours of the right to health are also especially
susceptible to the accelerating pace of pharmaceutical and
technological innovation and the changing epidemiological profiles
of populations. Both trends not only drive demand in health care
markets but also create ever more stress on financing those
systems. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, not only did
much of the region—particularly urban populations—undergo a
significant epidemiological transition from infectious diseases to
chronic conditions, technological advancements also drove the
organization of health systems to evolve significantly. The
archetypical physician with the little black bag was replaced by a
1
Inter-American Development Bank, Gini Coefficient of Per Capita Household
Income
–
Countries
comparison,
https://data.iadb.org/ViewIndicator/ViewIndicator?languageId=1&indicatorId=
1719&typeOfUrl=C [hereinafter IADB, GINI].
2
Anne-Emmanuelle Birn & Laura Nervi, Political Roots of the Struggle for
Health Justice in Latin America, 385 The Lancet 1174, 1174–1175 (2015) (discussing
how social movements incorporated health care into struggles for better working
and living conditions).
3
Alicia E. Yamin, Redefining Health: Challenging Power Relations, in POWER,
SUFFERING, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DIGNITY: HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORKS FOR
HEALTH AND WHY THEY MATTER 3, 73–98 (2015).
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complex apparatus that depended upon specialized equipment
and specialty practices, which in turn called for entirely different
financing, as well as service delivery, arrangements.4
In the late 1980’s and 1990’s, much of the region was facing the
effects of structural adjustment policies, often adopted under
undemocratic regimes, as well as new health reforms adding
market-based regulation to fragmented regimes based largely on
divisions between formal and informal employment sectors. At
the same time, in the wake of military dictatorships or particular
political inflection points (e.g. Colombia), a wave of new
constitutions and constitutional amendments came into being.
These new constitutions enshrined principles of transformative
constitutionalism that established social or welfare purposes as
integral to the design of the state, sometimes included enumeration
of specific social rights, and in many cases incorporated
international human rights norms through “constitutional blocs”
(“bloques de constitucionalidad”). In conjunction with chronic
democratic deficits and a lack of capacity on the part of many
governments to either respond to public clamor for health
demands or to effectively regulate health systems, easy individual
access to courts through such protection writs has created an acute
demand for medical treatments through judicial action.5
One way of understanding judicialization of health rights in the
region is precisely the gap between supply and demand, which
was accentuated in many instances by health reforms that
increased coverage of social insurance.6 However, in this Article I
argue that this analysis understates a principal conceptual
implication of construing health as a right, which is neither to deny
the scarcity of resources nor the need for rationing. It is rather to
understand the health system as a core social institution, and the
definition of the contours of an enforceable legal entitlement as
requiring a legitimate democratic process just as much as a credible
4
NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 161
(Cambridge University Press ed., 2008).
5
Alicia E. Yamin, Power, Suffering and Courts: Reflections on Promoting Health
Rights through Judicialization, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING
MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? 333–372 (2011) [hereinafter Yamin Reflections LHR].
6
EVERALDO LAMPREA, DERECHOS EN LA PRÁCTICA. JUECES, LITIGANTES Y
OPERADORES DE POLÍTICAS DE SALUD EN COLOMBIA (1991-2014) 31 (2015) [hereinafter
Lamprea, 2015].
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application of scientific-technical evidence.7 Understood in this
light, health systems embed normative decisions, from macrolevels in terms of solidarity of financing, including whether
irregular migrants are included, to the most micro-levels regarding
information provided by providers to patients.8 Further, in this
view, courts have a role to play in ensuring that the decisions taken
in health systems are justified and in keeping with fundamental
constitutional commitments, ranging from safeguarding the
dignity of women who seek abortions after sexual assault to the
extent of governmental obligations to provide health entitlements
that reflect equal concern and respect for all members of society.9
Yet all too often in the region, judicial remedies have been
appended onto broken systems and, while empirical evidence
regarding the equity effects of the flood of legal enforcement of
individual entitlements remains ambiguous, there are wellfounded concerns regarding the potential for judicialization to
skew attention to curative care from public health promotion
measures and to reduce aspirations for health justice to a feeble
“sufficientarianism.”10 In Part II of this Article, I outline the
constitutional provisions in relation to health rights11 in five
countries in the region—Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
and Mexico—pointing to some shared contextual factors and
concepts, as well as distinctive aspects that have shaped judicial
interpretation. In Part III, I then turn to experiences with
judicialization of health rights in the region. After briefly setting
out some context for the wholesale exploitation of individual
judicial actions, I explore the potential opportunities and
7
Alicia E. Yamin, Taking the Right to Health Seriously: Implications for Courts
and Health Systems’ 39(2) HUM. RTS. Q. (2017) [hereinafter Yamin HRQ].
8
Alicia E. Yamin & Ole F. Norheim, Taking Equality Seriously: Applying
Human Rights Frameworks to Priority Setting in Health, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 296, 296–324
(2014) [hereinafter Yamin and Norheim HRQ].
9
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación de Argentina [CSJN] [National
Supreme Court of Justice], 13/5/2012, “F. A. L. s/medida autosatisfactiva, Fallos
(259. XLVI) (Arg.); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 31,
2008, Sentencia T-760/08 (Colom.) [hereafter Colombia T-760/08].
10
Lukas Meyer, Sufficientarianism: Both International and Intergenerational? in
ABSOLUTE POVERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE: EMPIRICAL DATA, MORAL THEORIES,
INITIATIVES, 133–141 (Elke Mack et al. eds., 2009).
11
This phrase is used rather than the “right to health” because in the case of
Costa Rica, the Court has derived the right to health from two constitutional
rights: the protection of human life and the right to social security protection.
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challenges of dialogical remedies as a response to massive
judicialization. This is based upon a case study of the most
sweeping structural decision to date in this area, T 760/08, in
which the Colombian Constitutional Court called for reform of the
health system based upon the right to health.12 I conclude that
while dialogical remedies can potentially foster dialogue with the
executive as well as shifts in public discourse regarding health as a
right, there are significant limitations to the extent to which
judiciaries can destabilize the steep asymmetries of information
and power within health sectors, and catalyze greater democratic
participation in constructing the limits of health rights.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: CONCEPTS AND CONTENT
Although the actual constitutional provisions, as well as the
nature of the health system, differ substantially across countries in
the region, health rights are defined in terms of more than medical
care and are connected to larger economic and social issues and
policies in most of the constitutions of the region. This is critical, as
much greater percentages of population health and morbidity are
determined by social and political determinants of health than by
curative care.
Moreover, across these countries, structural
innovations in the wave of new constitutions and reforms have
deeply impacted how health rights have come to be interpreted
and enforced by courts. These have included two or more of the
following aspects: (a) the establishment of a “constitutional
jurisdiction,” sometimes with a high court or specialized chamber
of a high court overseeing it; (b) the introduction or modification of
protection writs (e.g., amparos, tutelas) as a mechanism to protect
and promote the rights endowed in the constitution; (c) the
incorporation of international human rights norms and standards
through a constitutional bloc; (d) the expansion of abstract review
of legislation; and (e) the reduction or virtual abolition of standing
requirements.13 The development of jurisprudence on the right to
Colombia T-760/08, supra note 9.
Alicia E. Yamin, Decision T-760 (2008) (Colom), in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (last updated Nov. 2017) at
¶ 7, 9–10 [hereafter Yamin T-760/08].
12
13
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health has been further enabled by a reduction in formalism on the
bench, reflected both in substantive erosions of distinctions
between directive principles and fundamental rights as well as in
practices regarding, e.g., amicus curiae.
2.1. Argentina
Argentina has a federal system of government, and health is
regulated at both the national and provincial levels. The military
dictatorship in Argentina (1976-83) incurred $36 billion in foreign
debt,14 and subsequent democratic governments implemented
structural adjustment programs to pay off national debt until the
government defaulted in 2001.15 Both the structural adjustment
and the default, and subsequent “Corralito,” had substantial
impacts on the health system.16 According to UN Independent
Expert Cephas Lumina, the crisis “severely affected the public
health system, with hospitals suffering a serious shortage of basic
supplies and prices of medicines soaring. In addition, the drastic
drop in employment left roughly 60 per cent of the population
outside the social health insurance system.”17 The current health
system is composed of public, social (a contributory regime for
those in formal employment based upon a social insurance
package), and private health sectors; and in practice is fragmented
to the point of what has been called “atomization,” which produces
inequities across plans and providers.18
14
International Monetary Fund, The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002,
Issues Paper/Terms of Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent
Evaluation
Office
(July
2003),
https://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2003/arg/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/95LF-SL7H].
15 See Rep. of the Indep. Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other
Related Int’l Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of all Hum.
Rts., particularly Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/50/Add. 3,
at 6–14 (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.undocs.org/A/HRC/25/50/Add.3
[https://perma.cc/XDH7-T9Y2] (describing the transformation of Argentina’s
economy in 2001, key challenges and implications, and obligations under human
rights law).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 6 ¶13.
18
Cf., Thomas Bossert et al., Comparative Review of Health System Integration in
Selected Countries in Latin America, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK [IDB]
TECHNICAL
NOTE
IDB-TN-585
(Jan.
2014),
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Social rights were initially embedded in the 1949 Constitution
under Juan Domingo Perón, reflecting the strong influence of the
labor movement under Peronism at the time. In the 1957 text,
Article 14 bis, incorporated social constitutionalism, which
established a “Social Security” system that included both
traditional social security and a broader concept of social
protection.19 However, it was through constitutional amendments
introduced in 1994 that announced equality and social justice as
organizing principles for the state, and gave human rights treaties
constitutional status through Article 75.22.20
The current constitutional protection of the right to health
extends well beyond medical care. For example, the constitution
protects the collective right to “a healthy and balanced
environment for human development” (Article 41) and consumers’
rights “to the protection of their health, safety, and economic
interests” (Article 43). Further, Article 75 mandates the Legislature
to provide certain health and other social protections on the basis
of social equality (Article 75), understood as including both formal
and substantive dimensions.21
The Argentine Supreme Court has recognized the
constitutional status of the right to health as a result of the
constitutional bloc.22 The Court has cited international norms in
https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6024/Technical%20Note
%20585-%20Health%20System%20Fragmentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR9K884G] (exploring the fragmentation of Latin American health systems across six
countries, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico; however
commenting on Juan-Luis Londono and Julio Frenk’s framework for
understanding Latin American health systems which describes Argentina’s as an
“atomize private model”).
19
Art. 14, Constitución Nacional [CONST. NAC.] [NATIONAL CONSTITUTION]
(Arg.).
20 See Paola Bergallo, Argentina: Courts and the Right to Health: Achieving
Fairness Despite “Routinization” in Individual Coverage Cases?, in LITIGATING HEALTH
RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH?, 43–75 (Alicia Ely. Yamin &
Siri Gloppen eds., 2011) [hereinafter Bergallo LHR] (noting how the 1994
amendments introduced new institutions for the protection of social rights with
specific implications for the right to health, and how the right to health was
further defined by references to human rights treaties which were included in
Article 75.22).
21 Id.
22
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court
of Justice] 24/10/2000, Ana Carina Campodónico de Beviacqua c. Ministerio de
Salud y Acción Social – Secreteria de Programas de Salud y Banco de Drogas
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support of protecting against unilateral termination of health
services by different health insurers, including private ones,23 in
enforcing obligations to guarantee access to treatment,24 and
holding that the federal government is a subsidiary guarantor in
various cases against provincial public contributory insurers.25 The
Court has also addressed the protection of the right to health in
relation to vulnerable groups, such as children,26 persons with
disabilities,27 people with severe diseases,28 and socially
marginalized communities.29
Paola Bergallo argues that courts’ increased involvement in
health in particular can be attributed not just to legal
developments, but also the failures of political organs of
government to respond to regulatory and oversight failure in the
fragmented health sector. Bergallo explains the amparo cases
clustering around demands for certain treatments or services.30 As
a result of regulatory failure, these clusters have emerged around
disputes over coverage for a particular illness or a particular group
of patients, as well as around particular insurer defendants.31
Neoplásicas, (Arg.), https://sj.csjn.gov.ar/sj/tomosFallos.do?method=iniciar
[https://perma.cc/7KF6-32SU] [hereinafter Campodónico CSJN].
23 Id.
24
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], 1/6/2000, Asociación Benghalensis y Otros c. Ministerio de Salud y
Acción Social – Estado Nacional, A. 186 (Arg.).
25
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], 21/8/2003, Neira, Luis Manuel y Otra c. Swiss Medical Group S.A.,
(Arg.); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], 8/6/2004, Martín, Sergio Gustavo y Otros c. Fuerza Aérea (Arg.).
26
Campodónico CSJN, supra note 22.
27
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], 1/10/2001, Monteserín, Marcelino c. Estado Nacional – Ministerio de
Salud y Acción Social – Comisión Nacional Asesora para la Integración de
Personas Discapacitadas – Servicio Nacional de Rehabilitación y Promoción de la
Persona con Discapacidad, (Arg.).
28
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], Dec. 18, 2004, Asociación de Esclerosis Múltiple de Salta c. Ministerio
de Salud – Estado Nacional (Arg.), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM]
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 28/8/2007, Cambiaso Péres de Nealón, Celia
María Ana y Otros c. Centro de Educación Médica e Investigaciones Médicas
(Arg.).
29
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], 18/9/2007, Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación c. Estado Nacional y Otra
(Provincia del Chaco) s. proceso de conocimiento (Arg.).
30
Bergallo LHR supra note 20, at 60.
31 Id.
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At the same time, other authors point to significant structural
precedents going beyond medical treatment and to precedents that
have utilized dialogical remedies. In the early case of Viceconte,32
public interest litigation sought to require the state to provide a
vaccine against the Argentine hemorrhagic fever that threatened
the lives of 3.5 million people, most of whom did not have access to
preventive medical services.33 The Federal Administrative Court of
Appeals ultimately ordered the government to designate funds for
completing the vaccination campaign and ensuring the production
of the vaccine, put a follow-up framework in place to oversee
compliance with its ruling, and established a deadline for the state
to meet the requirements.34
In a case involving the cleanup of the highly polluted MatanzaRiachuelo River Basin,35 the Argentine Supreme Court issued a
dialogical decision that established benchmarks and a timeline for
cleanup of the river basin, but left significant discretion to the
various agencies involved. The court also created a compliance
authority to manage all the activities triggered by a decision,
giving both civil society organizations and ordinary residents of
the affected area a voice and a place to be heard.36 Nevertheless,
after ten years, implementation has been less than satisfactory.37

32
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo
Federal, Sala IV (CNFed.) [National Court of Appeals in Federal and
Administrative Litigation of the Federal Capital: Court of Appeals in
Administrative Matters], 2/6/1998, Viceconte, Mariela C. c. Ministerio de Salud y
Acción Social La Ley [L.L.] (1998-F-305) (Arg.)
33 Id.
34 Id.
35
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], 8/7/2008, Mendoza Beatriz Silvia y Otros c. Estado Nacional y Otros s.
Daños y Perjuicios, (Arg.).
36 See generally Daniel M. Brinks, Varun Gauri & Kyle Shen, Social Rights
Constitutionalism: Negotiating the Tension Between the Universal and the Particular, 11
Ann.
Rev.
of
L.
and
Soc.
Sci.
289,
289–308
(2015),
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110413-030654
(discussing court monitoring/compliance efforts work to the extent that they
create new spaces for political mobilization).
37
See Roberto Gargarella, Deliberative Democracy, Dialogic Justice and the
Promise of Social and Economic Rights, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 105, 115 (Helena Alivar Garcia, Karl Klare & Lucy A.
Williams eds., 2016) (noting a mismatch in progressive social right protections and
their implementation due to an outdated and inefficient constitutional structure
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Indeed, the court has recently called attention to a number of
deficiencies that continue to hinder implementation efforts during
a public hearing, including the failure of multijurisdictional
agency, ACUMAR (Authority of the Matanza-Riachuelo River
Basin) to integrate human rights and environmental protection
concerns sufficiently in its work.38
2.2. Brazil
Brazil is a Federal Republic that stands out in the region both
for the scope and specificity of the right to health in its 1988 postdictatorship Constitution, as well as for the Unified Health System
(SUS, for its acronym in Portuguese) created under that
constitution. The country’s deep health inequities increased under
the dictatorship. For example, while children in the lowest wealth
quintile were 4.9 times more likely to be stunted than those from
families in the highest wealth quintile in 1974-75, this ratio
increased to 7.7 by the late 1980’s.39 The creation of the SUS,
including innovative mechanisms for citizen participation40, was an
integral part of the struggle for democratization in Brazil.41 In
contrast to Argentina, however, despite the incorporation of
international human rights norms into national law through the
constitution, relevant treaties have not been cited to extend the
contours of the right to health.
Health was recognized as a fundamental right in the
Constitution of 1988, under Title II. Article 6 states: “education,
health, work, housing, leisure, security, social security, protection
and divisions between the branches of government) [hereafter Gargarella
Deliberative Democracy].
38
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJM] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], 27/12/2016, “Mendoza Beatriz Silvia y otros c. Estadio Nacional y otros s/
daños y perjuicios, Fallos (2016-339-1795) (Arg).
39
Cesar G. Victoria et al., Maternal and Child Health in Brazil: Progress and
Challenges, 377 THE LANCET 1863, 1869–76 (2011) (discussing how Brazil has
undergone rapid changes in major social determinants of health and in the
organization of health services).
40
Armando De Negri Filho, Brazil: A Long Journey towards a Universal
Healthcare System, in ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 173–80 (2013).
41
Anne-Emmanuelle Birn & Laura Nervi, Political Roots of the Struggle for
Health Justice in Latin America, 385 THE LANCET 1174, 1174–5 (2015) (discussing how
Brazil’s health reform, is directly linked to the re-democratization movement).
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of motherhood and childhood, and assistance to the destitute, are
social rights under this Constitution.” The right to health must be
interpreted in light of Articles 196 to 200, which inter alia, state
clearly that health is to be guaranteed “by means of social and
economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other hazards
and at the universal and equal access to actions and services for its
promotion, protection and recovery . . . .” 42 Thus, the right to health is
defined broadly, beyond medical care to include actions and
policies involving “social and economic policies” in general
(Article 196), as well as public health measures such as
“preventative
activities”
(Article
198),
“sanitary
and
epidemiological actions,” “health of workers,” and “preservation
of the environment” (Article 200).
A small fraction of the litigation relating to health in Brazil does
relate to pre-conditions of health, such as sanitation.43 While
sanitation is a compulsory public service in Brazil, the constitution
does not establish a specific right to such services. Instead, Brazil’s
courts have referred to a right to sanitation services as a social and
economic right, tying it to the Brazilian constitution’s health rights
(Articles 6 and 196), environmental rights (Article 225) and, in
some cases, housing rights (Article 6).44 However, while there is
evidence that the courts have favored public health policies
granting sanitation services and that their decisions have fostered
greater political priority on sanitation, these decisions addressed
only a small part of the country’s need for sanitation services.45
Health rights litigation in Brazil, as elsewhere in the region, has
concentrated overwhelmingly on individual access to medical care
and, in particular, medications. Indeed, the great preponderance
of the tens of thousands of health rights claims have involved the
use of provisional protection measures to provide access to

Art. 196 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] (Braz.).
Ana P. de Barcellos, Sanitation Rights, Public Law Litigation, and Inequality:
A Case Study from Brazil, 16(2) H. AND HUM. R. J. 35, 37–38 (2014) (discussing how
litigation has addressed fewer than 177 out of the 2,495 Brazilian municipalities
that lack both sewage collection and treatment systems, and lawsuits are
concentrated in the richer cities, not in the poorest ones).
44 Id. at 37.
45 Id. at 42.
42
43
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individual entitlements.46 And nowhere are the equity impacts of
judicial enforcement of health rights more contested than in Brazil.
Octavio Motta Ferraz has written that judicialization has favored
the middle class and expensive medications, and has undermined
notions of formal equality in the Brazilian constitution by fostering
queue jumping.47 Joseph Amon and Joao Biehl have contested
critiques of judicialization as largely “myths” and have argued that
findings of benefits going to the middle class should simply spur
greater efforts at equal access to justice rather than restrictions on
judicial enforcement.48 Mariana Mota Prado notes that the debates
over equitable impact of the granting of entitlements obscures
another important aspect of judicial enforcement, which is greater
accountability and oversight in the complex Brazilian health
system.49 Although Brazil has a unified health system, the
differentiated responsibilities of the federal, state, and municipal
governments, as well as increasing privatization and failure to
establish parameters for convênios with the private sector,
undermine both equity and accountability.50
The politicized nature of judicialization of health rights has led
the judiciary and legislature to take certain measures recently. In
2011, Federal Act 12401 was passed calling for treatment to be
provided according to health system protocols and establishing a
new National Council for the Incorporation of Technologies
(CONITEC, by its acronym in Portuguese).
46
Octavio L.M. Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening
Health Inequities?, 11 H. AND HUM. R. J. 33–45 (2013) (discussing how the majority
right-to-health cases in Brazil to date have been filed by individual claimants and
have concerned the provision of curative medical treatment) [hereinafter Ferraz
HHRJ].
47
Octavio L.M. Ferraz et al., Judging the Price of Life: Cost Considerations in
Right to Health Litigation, in JURIDIFICATION AND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE WELFARE
STATE, 121–45 (2014).
48
João Biehl, Mariana P. Socal & Joseph J. Amon, The Judicialization of Health
and the Quest for State Accountability: Evidence from 1,262 Lawsuits for Access to
Medicines in Southern Brazil, 18(1) H. AND HUM. R. J. 209–20 (2016) (discussing how
judicialization may serve as a grassroots instrument for the poor to hold the state
accountable).
49
Mariana Mota Prado, The Debatable Role of Courts in Brazil’s Health Care
System: Does Litigation Harm or Help? 41(1) THE J. OF L. MED. & ET. 124–37 (2013)
(discussing about the right to health litigation in Brazil which could be generating
policy and institutional changes within the health care system).
50
Maria I. BRAVO, ET AL., A MERCANTILIZAÇÃO DA SAÚDE EM DEBATE: AS
ORGANIZAÇÃO SOCIAIS NO RIO DE JANEIRO. (UERJ: Cadernos de Saúde Pública 2015).
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In 2014, the Superior Court of Justice, denied an ordinary
appeal based on the fact that “registration with ANVISA is a
necessary condition to benefit from the product, being the first
requirement for the SUS to consider its incorporation” and
therefore, “in general, the treatment provided by the SUS should
be privileged rather than a different option chosen by the patient,
whenever the ineffectiveness or impropriety of the existing health
policy is not proven.”51 The Supreme Federal Tribunal had been
seeking to unify two judgments, one involving a treatment that has
not yet been registered by the Brazilian Sanitary Authority
(ANVISA, for its acronym in Portuguese) and one involving a high
cost treatment not yet incorporated by the Public Health System. 52
The judgment, which was temporarily suspended by a justice who
later died in a plane crash, would unify standards for granting
health entitlements that are not approved by the relevant executive
branch authorities. Nevertheless, on April 26, 2017, the Superior
Court of Justice (below the Supreme Federal Tribunal) ordered the
suspension of proceedings in cases where the medicine was not
incorporated in the SUS.53
2.3. Colombia
Colombia’s Constitution, adopted in 1991, enshrines principles
of transformative constitutionalism, including a “social state of
law.”54 However, Article 49 of the constitution defined health care,
as well as social security, not as a right but as a public service, to be
regulated, controlled and overseen by the state, yet open to the
participation of private capital.55 Since the adoption of the
51
Superior Tribunal de Justiça [STJ] [Superior Justice Tribunal] Apr. 23,
2015, Recurso em Mandado de Segurança, RO 2014/0130056-0, No. 45.703 (Braz.).
52
Supremo Tribunal Federal [STF] [Supreme Federal Court] May 13, 2010,
Recurso Extraordinário, RE 566471, No. 86/2010 (Braz.); Supremo Tribunal
Federal [STF] [Supreme Federal Court] Nov. 17, 2011, Recurso Extraordinário RG
657718 MG (Braz.).
53
Superior Tribunal de Justiça [STJ] [Superior Justice Tribunal] Recurso
Especial, RJ 2017/0025629-7, No. 1657156 (Braz.).
54 See Yamin T-760/08, supra note 13, at ¶ 6 (describing the basis and
principles upon which Colombia’s Constitution of 1991 was founded upon).
55
Art. 49 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] [Political Constitution
of Colombia] July 4, 1991; see also Everaldo Lamprea, Colombia’s Right-to-Health
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constitution, Colombia’s newly-created Constitutional Court has
actively shaped enforcement of the right to health and health
policy through a more engaged and less formalistic adjudication.56
In 1993, the enactment of Law 100 initiated a major reform of
Colombia’s health system, introducing a two-tiered system of
benefits, based upon an obligatory social insurance scheme tied to
managed care: a contributory regime for those in the formal sector
(POS-C) and a subsidized regime (POS-S), which contained
approximately half the benefits.57 Law 100 greatly increased
formal coverage.58 However, regulatory failure and fragmentation
between its main oversight bodies plagued Colombia’s health
system, making it difficult for the state to oversee the wide array of
private and public actors involved in operationalizing the complex
new system. 59
The evolution of judicial interpretation and enforcement of the
right to health in Colombia can be divided into four periods: 1) a
first phase characterized by generous court judgments related to
the right to health; 2) a second phase during which the use of
tutelas exploded; 3) the structural approach to the right to health in
judgment T-760/2008;60 and 4) subsequent developments,
including the enactment of a new Statutory Framework Law on
Health based on the state’s obligations to respect, protect, and
fulfill the right to health.
Litigation in a Context of Health Care Reform, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 131 (Colleen M. Flood &
Aeyal Gross eds., 2014) [hereinafter Lamprea 2014] (discussing the involvement of
private insurance companies in Colombia’s public health insurance system).
56 See Manuel J. Cepeda, Transcript: Social and Economic Rights and the
Colombian Constitutional Court, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1700–1705 (2011) (discussing
the impact of the decision T-7606 of 2008 on the right to health).
57
L. 100/93, diciembre 23, 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
58 See Lamprea 2015, supra note 6, at xii, 64 (detailing the massive increase in
formal health insurance coverage of Colombian citizens following the passage of
Ley 100 of 1993).
59
Alicia E. Yamin, Oscar Parra-Vera & Camila Gianella, Colombia: Judicial
Protection of the Right to Health: An Elusive Promise?, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS:
CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? 103, 110 (Alicia E. Yamin & Siri
Gloppen eds., 2011) [hereafter Yamin Colombia LHR].
60
César Rodríguez-Garavito, The Judicialization of Health Care: Symptoms,
Diagnosis, and Prescriptions, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME
COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP, 246–269 (Randall Peerenboom &
Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014) [hereinafter Rodríguez-Garavito 2014] (describing the
shift away from mass litigation towards structural reform following the T-760/08
decision to resolve issues surrounding the right to health).
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The Constitutional Court’s early rulings relied upon a doctrine
of “fundamental rights by virtue of connection” (doctrina de
conexidad) to hold that despite being a directive principle, the right
to health could be claimed before courts when the lack of a good or
service endangered the life of the claimant or the possibility to lead
a dignified life, despite being a directive principle. The court also
held the right to health, enforceable in cases involving a person or
group of people in especially vulnerable circumstances, or a claim
for health care defined in the POS.61 It is important to note that the
court issued opinions that went beyond individual entitlements,
considering proposed budget cuts to the subsidized regime,
eligibility requirements for establishing indigence, definitions of
comprehensive care, and protections from interruption of
coverage.62
However, by 2008, courts throughout the country had become
an essential “escape valve” for individual Colombians who were
denied access to medicines, surgeries, and treatments by a health
system incapable of regulating itself.63
The Human Rights
Ombuds Office calculated that between 1999 and 2008 individuals
presented 674,612 tutelas relating to health rights.64 Both the
Human Rights Ombuds Office and the non-governmental
organization, DeJusticia, called for the court to step in and declare
an “unconstitutional state of affairs.”65
In 2008, a specialized review chamber of the Constitutional
Court issued judgment T-760/08, which resolved twenty-two
individual tutelas that represented systematic failures, and called
for structural reforms in the health system. The orders, which
largely reiterated and synthesized prior jurisprudence and were
based upon existing legislative frameworks, included: updating the
61
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 11, 1992,
Sentencia T-484/92, Relatoría de la Corte Constitucional No. 2130 (Colom.).
62 See Corte Constitucional [CC] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 6, 2000,
Sentencia C-1165/00, Relatoría de la Corte Constitucional No. D-2873) (Colom.)
(discussing how budget cuts in the POS-S constitute an impermissible
retrogression, and the budget was subsequently revised.).
63
Yamin T-760/08, supra note 13, at ¶ 22.
64
Yamin Colombia LHR, supra note 59, at 113.
65
PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA NACIÓN & DEJUSTICIA, EL DERECHO A LA
SALUD EN PERSPECTIVA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EL SISTEMA DE INSPECCIÓN,
VIGILANCIA Y CONTROL DEL ESTADO COLOMBIANO EN MATERIA DE QUEJAS EN SALUD
11 (2008).
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bundles of health benefits and achieving universal coverage,
progressively unifying the subsidized, and contributory insurance
regimes to improve the health system’s reimbursement procedures.
The court also called for greater oversight of different insurance
companies (EPS, for their acronym in Spanish) and administrative
mechanisms aimed at resolving disputes.66
The decision adopted what Roberto Gargarella describes as a
“dialogical understanding” of the system of checks and balances.67
While the court set broad goals and implementation pathways, set
deadlines and included the need for progress reports, it left
substantive decisions and detailed outcomes to governmental
agencies.68 Based on the example of a previous case relating to
Internally Displaced Persons (T 025/04), the court established a
follow-up unit to gather information, monitor compliance with the
decision’s orders, and organize public hearings for issues relating
to the orders.69 In 2015, in the wake of T-760/08, Colombia’s
Congress passed the Statutory Framework Law (Law 1751), which
places the right to health at the center of the health system.70
Nevertheless, individual health rights litigation in Colombia
remains intense.71

66 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 31, 2008,
Sentencia T-760/08, Relatoría de la Corte Constitucional (Colom.) (reasserting the
right to health and detailing types of regulation necessary to maintain this right).
See also Yamin T-760/08, supra note 13, at ¶23–6, 45 (describing the Constitutional
Court’s ruling that the executive and legislative branches reform the health
industry and the steps taken by the Santos administration following this ruling to
provide further oversight).
67
Gargarella Deliberative Democracy, supra note 37, at 105.
68 See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117, HARV. L. R. 1030, 1016–1100 (2004) (discussing the
transformation of the government’s function from provider to guarantor of care).
69 See Lamprea 2015, supra note 6, at 88 (describing the special three
magistrate chamber process similar to the one used in T 025/04 assigned to
provide oversight).
70
L. 1751/15, febrero 16, 2015, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
71 See Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia, Sigue Creciendo el Número de
Tutelas en Salud, DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO COLOMBIA (Apr. 7, 2015),
http://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/noticias/3414/Sigue-creciendo-eln%C3%BAmero-de-tutelas-en-salud-Tutelas-salud-D%C3%ADa-Mundial-de-lasalud-justicia-Plan-Obligatorio-de-Salud-Fallos-de-tutela-Derechos-HumanosEPS.htm) [https://perma.cc/5B2C-D6XC] (detailing a report by the
Ombudsman’s Office regarding an increase in health-related legal action between
2013 and 2014).
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2.4. Costa Rica
Compared with other countries in the region, Costa Rica’s
health statistics reflect fewer disparities. Yet, by comparison with
international standards, the country still has a high degree of
income inequality (GINI 50.69 in 2015),72 which translates into
differential health outcomes and health gaps. There are major
challenges in terms of skilled health professional’s density, which
is why efforts should be made to increase the expenditure on
health research and development, considering it is one of the
lowest in the world.73 Costa Rica’s health system is composed of a
public and a private sector. The public sector is mainly based on a
social insurance scheme provided through the Caja Costarricense de
Seguro Social (CCSS), an autonomous institution in charge of
financing, purchasing, and delivering health services. For its part,
the private sector includes ambulatory and hospital care services,
which are financed mostly out-of-pocket or with insurance
premiums.74
The constitution, which dates from 1949, contains an extensive
list of civil and political rights, but not social rights.75 The right to
health is a derived right, constructed from the right to life (Article
21) and the right to social security (Article 73).76
Judicial enforcement of health rights was enabled by a 1989
constitutional amendment that added a seven-member
constitutional chamber to the existing three chambers of the Costa
Rican Supreme Court (Sala IV) and amended Article 48 to include a
72
Inter-American Development Bank, supra note 1 (indicating the per capita
household income for Latin American countries).
73
World Health Organization [WHO], World Health Statistics 2016:
Monitoring Health for the SDGs, Sustainable Development Goals 79 (2016)
http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/2016/en/
[https://perma.cc/6JAG-QX6K].
74 See María del Rocío Sáenz et al., The Health System of Costa Rica, 53 SALUD
PÚBLICA DE MEX., 5156, 5156–7 (2011) (discussing how the private sector includes a
broad set of services offering ambulatory and hospital care).
75 See generally Constitución Política de Costa Rica [C.P.C.R.] Nov. 7, 1949.
76 See Bruce M. Wilson, Costa Rica: Health Rights Litigation: Causes and
Consequences, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO
HEALTH? 132, 142 (Alicia Ely Yamin & Sirir Gloppen eds., 2011) [hereinafter
Wilson LHR] (explaining that the 1949 Costa Rican Constitution lacks an explicit
right to health).
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constitutional bloc, giving international human rights treaties the
same force as constitutional law, along with Articles 10, 105 and
128.77
Bruce Wilson argues that unlike the prior supreme court, the
Sala IV used its centralized judicial review powers to abandon the
legal formalism of the earlier court, and to assertively enforce
individual rights, including health-related rights, through its
interpretation of the right to life.78 The enabling law that
accompanied the creation of the Sala IV (Ley de la Jurisdicción
Constitucional), not only mandated the court to guarantee the
supremacy of the norms and constitutional principles, international
law, and communal law in force, as well as their uniform
interpretation and application, it also removed virtually all barriers
to accessing the court.79
The role of the Sala IV in expanding and enhancing the
understanding of health rights has been significant. Through its
rulings it has imposed and delineated the Caja’s way towards the
full enjoyment of health rights. For instance, the Sala IV has
regularly ruled in favor of transplant patients, antiretroviral
coverage for HIV/AIDS patients and keeping clinics open that the
Caja wanted to close.
Indeed, the ability of marginalized
individuals and organizationally weak groups in Costa Rica,
including LGBT groups, to seek protection and enforcement of
their constitutional rights made this judicial avenue particularly
attractive. As Wilson writes:
[O]nce the court had constructed a fundamental right to
health—and once it became clear that the Caja
Costarricense routinely complied with the court’s rulings—
the legal opportunity structure became increasingly
obvious . . . . While the average success rate for amparo
cases is approximately 25%, the success rate in recent years
for health rights amparo claims against the Caja is over
60%.80

Id.
Id.
79 Id. at 138 (suggesting that the judicial resolution to disputes involving
rights violations increased the court’s caseload).
80 Id. at 140–1.
77
78
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2.5. Mexico
From the time of the Mexican Revolution, health has been
addressed in relation to agrarian reform, the establishment of social
security and labor protections, and ambiguous efforts concerning
the status of indigenous groups.
The health system was
historically based upon segmented schemes for those employed in
formal and informal sectors, with a few special regimes, e.g. for the
military. In 2003, the program Seguro Popular at least formally
created universal social protection and health coverage. The
architect of the Seguro Popular and Minister of Health at the time,
Julio Frenk, stated:
The shift in power [in the election of President Vicente Fox
from the opposition, PAN] that took place in 2000 was an
indication that Mexico had made major progress in the
exercise of civil and political rights. The following step was
to reduce inequalities by creating the conditions for the
universal and effective exercise of social rights, including
the right to health care.81
Nonetheless, inequalities and segmentation persist in Mexico’s
health system and reflect those of the overall society.82
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 is often considered as a font
of social constitutionalism in the region, as well as the inspiration
for many of the economic and social rights provisions in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.83
It was the first

81 See Julio Frenk & Octavio Gómez-Dantés, Ethical and Human Rights
Foundations of Health Policy: Lessons from Comprehensive Reform in Mexico, 17(2) H.
AND HUM. RTS. J. 31, 33–37 (2015) (discussing the “democratization of health”).
82
Inter-American Development Bank, supra note 1; see also WHO, Global
Health
Observatory:
México:
Country
Profiles,
(2011),
http://www.who.int/gho/countries/mex/country_profiles/en/
[https://perma.cc/RN9A-ZRPL].
83 See Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism: Social Rights and
the “Engine Room” of the Constitution, 4, NOTRE DAME J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 9, 12–18,
(2014) (describing the engine room which consists of the power-granting
provisions of the constitution that determine the relative authority of
governmental actors).
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constitution in the world to include justiciable social rights,
including health and a healthy environment (Article 4).84
The Constitution established that: “Every person has the right
to health protection. The law shall determine the bases and terms
to access health services and shall establish the competence of the
Federation and the Local Governments in regard to sanitation.”85
It also explicitly protects the right to health for children and
indigenous people. In the 1980’s, through legislation creating the
social security institute, Article 4 came to be understood as an
individual right.
Articles 103 and 107 of the constitution establish writs of amparo
as a means of seeking protection of constitutional rights.86 Amparo
extends, but is not limited, to the first 29 Articles of the Mexican
Constitution, which include the right to health. It also extends to
human rights enshrined in international treaties, through a
constitutional bloc incorporated via the 2011 amendment to the
constitution. However, Article 1 stipulates that these treaties are
incorporated to the extent they do not contradict the Mexican
Constitution.87 The 2011 amendment also expanded standing to
bring an amparo to any party with a legitimate interest (“interés
legítimo v interés jurídico”), whether individual or collective. 88
These recent structural reforms in the Constitution, following a
significant reform of the judiciary in 1994, were instrumental in
enabling what Justice Gutierrez Ortiz Mena has described as “a
new attitude” on the Mexican Supreme Court (and in turn other
courts), which construed the constitution as enforceable law, as
opposed to a political text. The Radilla Pacheco case, an enforced
disappearance case in which the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights declared the national government of México responsible for
sub-national failures, also came to be an inflection point in regard
84 See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CPEUM], Arts.
3, 4, 5 and 123, feb. 2, 1917.
85 Id. at art. 4 (4).
86 Id. at arts. 103 and 107.
87 Id. at art. 1.
88 Id., at art. 107(I) (mandating that the constitutional adjudication (appeal on
the grounds of unconstitutionality) shall be carried out at the request of the
offended party. The offended party is the holder of an individual or collective
right, which has been violated by the challenged act, affecting his/her legal
framework, either directly or by the means of his/her special situation before the
legal system.).
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to the incorporation of federal constitutional principles to states
and the supremacy of national laws.89
In recent years, the court has decided cases relating to
regulation of products affecting health,90 decriminalization of
abortion,91 and access to entitlements. For example, in 2014, the
court considered two important cases. In the Pabellón 13 case, the
court granted an amparo in favor of three HIV/AIDS patients and
concluded that the failure to execute the project for the
construction of a specialized ward for HIV/AIDS was a violation
of the right to health.92 Second, the court considered a lawsuit
brought by seventeen patients that would have required the
Mexican social security system, IMSS, to cover Soliris for a
condition that some 250 patients have, at a cost of nearly $140
million every year.93 The court did not rule that that the health
system must pay for Soliris, noting that the drug had not yet gone
through review by a commission that is charged with including or
excluding drugs from the basic catalog of drugs.94 Arguably, the
Mexican Supreme Court deferred to a commission that does not
meet the requirements of a fair process, because it lacks adequate
transparency and does not include a range of stakeholders in its
deliberation.95 To date, unlike Colombia for example, the Mexican
89 See Case of Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 209
(Nov. 23, 2009).
90
Amparo en revisión, quejosos y recurrentes 237/2014. Pleno de la
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México [CSJN], Semanario Judicial de
la Federación del viernes 11 de julio de 2014 (Mex.); Amparo en Revisión
350/2014, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México [CSJN],
Semanario Judicial de la Federación de septiembre 17, 2014 (Mex.).
91
Acciones de inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 and 147/2007. Pleno de la
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México [CSJN], Semanario Judicial de
la Federación y su Gaceta, agosto 28, 2008 (Mex.).
92
Amparo en Revisión 378/2014, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la
Nación de México [CSJN] Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta,
noviembre 14, 2014. (Mex.).
93
Amparo en Revisión 350/2014, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la
Nación de México [CSJN], Semanario Judicial de la Federación de septiembre 17,
2014 (Mex.).
94 Id.
95 See Norman Daniels et al., Role of the Courts in the Progressive Realization of
the Right to Health: Between the Threat and the Promise of Judicialization in Mexico, 1
HEALTH SYS. & REFORM 229, 232 (2015) (discussing the commission that was
charged with including or excluding drugs from a basic catalog of drugs).
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Supreme Court has not asked the Executive for rationale or
reasoning underpinning legislation and regulations in relation to
health. In a 2015 lecture at Harvard, Justice Gutierrez Ortiz Mena
argued that as a counter-majoritarian institution, the court may
“jump-start” the political process, but it must not substitute for it.96
3. JUDICIALIZATION OF HEALTH RIGHTS: FROM INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS
TO DIALOGICAL REMEDIES
Since the introduction of these new constitutions and
amendments, the region has seen an unparalleled explosion of
health rights litigation. The volume of litigation has been greatest
in Colombia, with 1,323,292 tutelas related to health filed between
1999 and 2014, according to the Human Rights Ombuds office.97
Notably, the number of tutelas filed each year increased from
approximately 20,000 in 1999 to over 118,000 in 2014.98 In Brazil,
there are an estimated 800,000 accumulated cases still pending
from 2014 to 2017 at all levels (federal, state, and municipal) in
courts across the country, and an estimated average of 200,000 new
cases a year in each of the past four years.99
In Costa Rica, approximately 19,000 health-related cases were
filed before the Sala IV between 1989 and 2009. While few health
cases were filed initially during that timeframe, health-related
cases rose at a much faster rate than the court’s total caseload after
1999.100 In Argentina, the lack of systematic record-keeping makes
it difficult to continuously tally cases. However, a study done by
Bergallo found 6,528 right to health claims filed between 1998 and

96
Justice Alfredo Gutierrez Ortiz Mena, The Role of the Mexican Supreme
Court in Mexico’s Democracy, lecture at David Rockefeller Center for Latin
American Studies, Harvard University, (Dec. 4, 2015), (transcript available at
https://drclas.harvard.edu/event/mexican-supreme-court)
[https://perma.cc/GY6Z-2DES].
97
DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO OF COLOMBIA, LA TUTELA Y LOS DERECHOS A LA
SALUD Y A LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 86 (Def. del Pueblo, 2015) [hereinafter Defensoría
Colombia Tutela Salud].
98 Id.
99
OCTAVIO LUIZ MOTTA FERRAZ, HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT (forthcoming
2019)(manuscript at 8–10, on file with author).
100
Wilson LHR, supra note 76, at 140.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/4

2019]

The Right to Heath in Latin America

719

2007, with the number per year tripling during that time (449 cases
in 1998; 1,159 cases in 2007).101101
A number of factors underlie the volume of health rights
litigation, which stem from the health system as well as political
and legal systems. The health systems, although differing in their
institutional arrangements, are characterized by ineffective
oversight and regulation, and inadequate administrative dispute
resolution mechanisms. For example, in Colombia and Argentina,
“quality-skimping”—i.e., where benefits included in the POS or
PMO, respectively, are routinely denied—accounts for the majority
of lawsuits. Incentives created for providers and insurance
companies, through a combination of inadequate pharmaceutical
regulations and reimbursement procedures, also contribute both to
the medications and services claimed, as well as compliance
rates.102 These are more accurately understood as market failure
and regulatory gap problems, and not “judicial activism.”103
Further, administrative mechanisms for resolving disputes are
often cumbersome or perceived as captured by insurance
companies or governmental corruption. For example, in Mexico,
while the percentage of complaints related to discontent with
health services received by CONAMED (National Commission of
Medical Arbitration) has been relatively low, around 2%, public
human rights bodies are receiving approximately 3,000 right to
health protection complaints each year.104 According to the UN
High Commissioner’s Mexico Office, because direct tools for
demanding the right to health do not exist, individuals are instead

101 See Bergallo LHR, supra note 20, at 52–53 (presenting figures depicting the
graphs on health amparos filed before the Federal Civil and Commercial Courts of
the City of Buenos Aires).
102 See generally Rodrigo Uprimny & Juanita Duran, Equidad y Protección
Judicial del Derecho a la Salud en Colombia, Series Políticas Sociales 197, ECON.
COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN [ECLAC] 1–68 (2014),
[hereinafter
Uprimny
Duran]
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/36758/S2014181_es.pdf?s
equence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/K33Y-RRBA].
103 See Yamin Reflections LHR, supra note 5, at 355–357 (explaining the other
dimensions of equity in the healthcare priority setting).
104 See generally Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, Indicadores
sobre el a la Salud en México, UN High Commissioner of Human Rights [UNHCHR]
5–204 (2011), http://www.hchr.org.mx/images/doc_pub/indicadores_salud.pdf
[https://perma.cc/64QY-CRWS].
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turning to the amparo mechanism for the realization of this right.105
Similarly, the Scientific-Technical Committees which were created
in Colombia through Law 1428 to resolve claims for services
outside the obligatory insurance scheme were widely perceived as
rubber-stamping insurance company decisions and had little
impact on the use of tutelas.106
Additionally, the combination of chronic political failure and
extremely easy access to courts to resolve health claims (through
protection writ mechanisms) has fostered an explosion in
judicialization. Legislatures are often perceived as transactional
rather than representative, and there is high distrust of executive
branches that are perceived as corrupt, ineffectual and
politicized. 107 It is worth pointing out for example that in
Colombia the most litigated right is the “derecho a la petición”
(right of petition) which is invoked when a bureaucrat fails to carry
out his or her functions.108 On the other hand, extremely low
financial, legal, and procedural barriers make pursuing health
rights claims through the courts an appealing option. In all of the
countries discussed above, access to the courts is very easy, and
people are guaranteed a decision within days.109
Judicialization of health rights should not necessarily be
celebrated. The exploitation of “rights” for individual entitlements
has the potential to exacerbate, rather than mitigate, underlying
inequities associated with access to health services and treatments.
More troubling than possible outliers, such as a 1997 Brazilian case
involving treatment in the United States for Duschenne’s muscular
dystrophy, is evidence that courts may be systematically
exacerbating inequities.110 In Colombia, a study by Uprimny and
Id. at 55.
Mauricio Torres-Tovar, Resistencias y Luchas Sociales en Latinoamérica por la
Garantía del Derecho a la Salud. El Caso Colombiano, in POR EL DERECHO UNIVERSAL A
LA SALUD: UNA AGENDA LATINOAMERICANA DE ANÁLISIS Y LUCHA 99–120 (Carolina
T. Henrion & Asa C. Laurell eds., 2015) [hereinafter Torres-Tovar].
107
VICTOR ABRAMOVICH & CHRISTIAN COURTIS, LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES COMO
DERECHOS EXIGIBLES (Trotta ed., 2004). See also, ROBERTO GARGARELLA & JUAN F.
GONZALEZ-BERTOMEU, THE LATIN AMERICAN CASEBOOK: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS,
AND RIGHTS (Routledge ed., 2016).
108
Defensoría Colombia Tutela Salud, supra note 97, at 73.
109
Siri Gloppen, Litigating Health Rights: Framing the Analysis, in LITIGATING
HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? 20 (Alicia E. Yamin
& Siri Gloppen eds., 2011).
110
Ferraz HHRJ, supra note 46.
105
106
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Duran found that 35.2% of tutelas have been brought by 53.11% of
those affiliated with the subsidized regime (containing half the
benefits) and 35.8% of tutelas brought by 46.89% of those affiliated
with the contributory regime in 2012.111 Further, substantive
equality in health is not just a matter of socio-economic inequality;
it is also a matter of life chances determined by the severity of
illness or condition. In a study based on random sampling of cases
decided by the Sala IV in Costa Rica, Norheim and Wilson found
that 3% of awarded treatments and services to be “high priority” in
accordance with generally accepted criteria of priority-setting,
including the “worst off” in terms of severity of illness, while over
70% would have been low priority.112 While the weightings of
criteria may vary, the conclusions are troubling in that they suggest
a distortion of budgetary priorities by the Caja.
Further, the reduction of health rights to individual claims may
skew policies and programs toward the subjects of litigation, and
therefore, away from public health measures that have the
potential to benefit the poor to a greater extent. It also may reduce
robust egalitarian aspirations of health—and in turn social—justice
to minimal packages of care.113 High courts in the region have
issued structural orders in health not only in response to a
collective suit, but also in response to concerns about the inequity
of individual concession of entitlements or the legitimate use of the
judicial system, or sometimes both. Such remedies—whether in
the case of T-760/08 in Colombia or the Matanza-Riachuelo case in
Argentina—are appropriate for systematic violations,114 where
complex orders relating to institutions and processes are involved,
rather than dictating specific outcomes.
Through dialogical
remedies, courts may be better able to not only preserve their own
constitutional legitimacy in addressing complex policy questions,
Uprimny Duran, supra note 102, at 33.
See Ole F. Norheim & Bruce M. Wilson, Health Rights Litigation and Access
to Medicines: Priority Classification of Successful Cases from Costa Rica’s Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court 16(2) HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. J. 47, 53 (2014)
(discussing the results of health rights litigation for medications).
113
Yamin Reflections LHR, supra note 5; Yamin HRQ, supra note 7.
114 See Roberto Gargarella, Dialogic Justice in the Enforcement of Social Rights:
Some Initial Arguments, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE
JUSTICE TO HEALTH? 232, 242–243 (2011) (providing examples of what judges could
do in situations of massive, structural violations of rights).
111
112
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but also catalyzing democratic participation and dialogue between
branches of government regarding spending priorities and critical
health policy questions.115 No judgment relating to health rights
has been more sweeping than T-760/08 in Colombia, which
illustrates both the potential and challenges for dialogical justice in
relation to health in the region.
3.1. The Potential and Challenges of Dialogical Remedies: T-760/08
The law that reformed Colombia’s health system in 1993, Law
100, was a striking example not just of a wave of what Juan Arroyo
has classified as “silent reforms” in health in the region, due to the
lack of democratic discussion about them, but also of the
dysfunction in the Colombian political and legislative arena.116
Law 100 was defined and written by teams of technocrats and
insulated from broad public debate. The final law was rushed
through the legislature, passed shortly before Christmas—
December 23, 1993—and implemented as quickly as possible
through decrees, before a change of presidential administration
would take place months later.117
The benefits package was put together without a
comprehensive epidemiological analysis of the needs of the
population, the burden of disease or the institutional capacities of
the health system, and were not systematically costed to calculate
the capitation rates. After 1993, the benefits package was amended
in piecemeal fashion, largely in response to political pressures
rather than empirical evidence. Further, the managed competition
115
Alicia E. Yamin, POWER, SUFFERING, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DIGNITY:
HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORKS FOR HEALTH AND WHY THEY MATTER 142 (University
of Pennsylvania Press ed., 2016) [hereinafter Yamin Power, Suffering, and the
Struggle for Dignity].
116
JUAN ARROYO, SALUD: LA REFORMA SILENCIOSA 9 (Universidad Peruana
Cayetano
Heredia
ed.,
2000),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280930380
_Salud_La_Reforma_Silenciosa_Lima_Universidad_Peruana_Cayetano_Heredia_
enero_del_2000_213_pags [https://perma.cc/LV6Z-GXAC]. See supra note 106.
117 See Alicia E. Yamin & Oscar Parra-Vera, Judicial Protection of the Right to
Health in Colombia: From Social Demands to Individual Claims to Public Debates, 33
HASTINGS INT´L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 437 (2010) (discussing the process by which
Law 100 was implemented by “change teams” who were cloaked from the public
eye).
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system adopted in Law 100 required a regulated market in which
effective governmental agencies would guide the financing,
organization, and service delivery in the health system to align
with public interest.118 But policies to improve the efficiency and
equity of the health system were not implemented; regulations
regarding eligibility and updating of services were neglected;
complaints were not addressed in a systematic manner. In short,
patients were left with no alternative but to use tutela writs.119
After Law 100 was enacted, there were brief periods of social
mobilization around health from workers and certain user groups,
but a strong social movement around health has not been sustained
through the years.120 This is partially due to the nature of the
health sector, with its strongly organized financial actors and often
poorly organized or fragmented groups of patients. It is also due
to the particular nature of Colombia, plagued by armed conflict,
and other forms of violence as well as political capture, where
outside of large urban areas social mobilization around health was
scant to non-existent.
Despite efforts by the Constitutional Court to unify
jurisprudence and to emphasize policy criteria, two problems
persisted: (1) the EPS were recalcitrant with respect to
implementing the policies and interpretations of “integral care,”
“continuous care,” etc. called for by the Court; and (2) lower courts
that heard tutela cases throughout the country were not wellequipped to determine whether medications and other treatments
outside the defined obligatory benefit plan should be provided as a
matter of right.121 In judgment T-760/08 the court moved from a
case-by-case approach to a structural approach that focused on
resolving the systematic failures underlying the avalanche of
individual claims.122
In the judgment, the court explicitly asserted that a structural
approach to the health system’s failings was necessary because
“the organs of government responsible for the regulation of the
Lamprea 2014, supra note 55, at 132–134.
Rodríguez-Garavito 2014, supra note 60, at 256–257.
120 Id., at 258–261.
121
Yamin Power, Suffering, and the Struggle for Dignity, supra note 115, at
123–125.
122
Rodríguez-Garavito 2014, supra note 60.
118
119
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health system have not adopted decisions that guarantee the right
to health without having to seek recourse through the tutela.”123
Notably absent in the expansive structural approach, however, is a
gender perspective regarding the failures of the health system to
respect and protect reproductive health, or the disproportionate
burden on women of the two-tiered system given their dependence
on male partners and predominantly work in the informal
sector.124
Beyond resolving the twenty-two individual cases, the court
addressed its diagnosis of the structure of the system, calling for
remedies and reforms that included updating the bundles of health
benefits, unifying the subsidized and contributory insurance
regimes, improving the health system’s financial arrangements,
and achieving universal coverage.125 The court further called for
adequate information regarding the institutional performance of
different insurance companies.126 Additionally, the court asked the
other branches of government to design administrative
mechanisms to resolve disputes in order to reduce the amount of
litigation, as well as the denial of both services and information by
providers and insurers.127
As noted above, this judgment exemplifies Sabel and Simon’s
theory of “experimentalist regulation.”128 In the opinion, the court
established broad goals and implementation pathways, set
deadlines, and included the need for progress reports, but
importantly left substantive decisions and detailed outcomes to
governmental agencies.129 This form of remedy not only arguably
Colombia T-760/08, supra note 9.
Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127
Katherine G. Young & Julieta Lemaitre, The Comparative Fortunes of the
Right to Health: Two Tales of Justiciability in Colombia and South Africa, 26 HARV.
HUM. RTS., J. 180, 191–192 (2013) [hereinafter Young and Lemaitre].
128
Sabel & Simon, supra note 68, at 1019.
129
Ceasar Rodriguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial
Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1669, 1677 (2011),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r27171.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUG6-3LNL],
reprinted in Alicia Ely Yamin & Fiona Lander, Implementing a Circle of
Accountability: A Proposed Framework for Judiciaries and Other Actors in Enforcing
Health-Related Rights, 14 J. OF HUM. RTS. 312, 324 (2015) ([the court] “set broad goals
and clear implementation paths through deadlines and progress reports, while
leaving substantive decisions and detailed outcomes to government agencies”)
[hereinafter Yamin and Lander].
123
124
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preserves the democratic and institutional legitimacy of the
judiciary better than command-and–control remedies, but also
importantly avoids the possibility of serious judicial error in the
interpretation of a specific aspect of the right to health.
Citing the government’s failure to take steps toward a
unification of the contributory and subsidized plans as mandated
in Law 100, the court ordered the government to unify the POS-C
and POS-S immediately for children and progressively, in keeping
with available resources, for adults.130 However, it did not propose
what goods and services would be included in a unified POS for
adults, or automatically equate unification with equalization;
rather, it left that to the relevant government agencies but
stipulated that the process of devising a unification plan was to be
participatory—including the medical and scientific community as
well as users of the system—transparent in terms of its reasoning,
and evidence-based.131
The judgment established a monitoring process, modeled on an
earlier judgment concerning internally displaced persons (IDPs), T025/2004, also authored by Justice Cepeda.132 The possibility of
such a follow-up review was made possible by the tutela, although
subsequent changes to the statute of the Constitutional Court in
2015 make such a review chamber more difficult to establish in the
future. In 2009, only months after the judgment, Justice Cepeda
finished his term on the court.133 The follow-up chamber and
attendant follow-up unit were subsequently overseen by Justice
Jorge Ivan Palacio.
The developments after judgment T-760/08 have been shaped
by conflict and cooperation among the Constitutional Court, the
executive and legislative branches of government, and social
Colombia T-760/08, supra note 9.
See generally Yamin and Lander, supra note 129 (noting the benefits of
accountability in the health care space, especially those plans which are
collectively derived from both needs and evidenced based research).
132
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004,
Sentencia T-025/04 (Colom.) (declaring that the fundamental rights of the
country’s internally displaced persons were being disregarded in such a massive,
protracted, and recurring manner, that an “unconstitutional state of affairs” had
arisen and issuing a number of complex orders aimed at overcoming the problems
that gave rise to this situation and protecting the rights of the country’s entire
displaced population.).
133
Yamin Colombia LHR, supra note 59, at 114.
130
131
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movements. The Uribe administration (2002–2010) was openly
resistant to the judgment. Arguing that health rights litigation had
brought about an imminent financial collapse of the health system,
Uribe employed the extraordinary provisional powers of the
constitution, and in December 2009 declared an economic state of
emergency and issued 13 decrees that resulted in substantial
changes to the immediate functioning of the health system.134
The impact of the T-760/08 decision likely would not have
been as great were it not for the Uribe administration’s autocratic
response. The decrees created an uproar among patients and
medical associations, as well as the general public. The decrees
gave way to an unexpected level of protest that included doctors,
medical students, health sector workers and middle-class
contributors, whose benefits were significantly curtailed.135
Importantly, these protests included people who were not typical
social dissidents, such as physicians and members of the Catholic
hierarchy.136 By February 2010, mass protests were taking place
across Colombia using the slogan, “Health is not a favor; it is a
right.”137
Although scholars have debated the impact, breadth, and
strength of the social movements, Uribe’s response arguably
promoted greater social mobilization around health in Colombia.
Suddenly, the wide range of stakeholders that advocated for health
as a right were aligned and galvanized in their advocacy and
actions, and those who defended the model of health as a
commodity were more visible. The Uribe administration’s reaction
inspired the reorganization of civil society groups around health in
the “Alianza Nacional por la Salud” (ANSA for their Spanish
acronym).138
In April 2010, in Judgment C-252/2010,139 the Constitutional
Court declared the emergency decrees unconstitutional, except for
Lamprea 2014, supra note 55; Yamin Colombia LHR, supra note 59.
See Young and Lemaitre, supra note 127 at 184 (describing the decades of
civil unrest that led to the eventual adoption of the universal right to health in the
1991 Colombian Constitution); see also Yamin Colombia LHR, supra note 58, at
121–122.
136 See Yamin Colombia LHR, supra note 59, at 121.
137 Id.
138
Torres-Tovar, supra note 106, at 113.
139
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 16, 2010,
Sentencia
C-252/2010
(Colom.),
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/C-252-10.htm
134
135

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/4

2019]

The Right to Heath in Latin America

727

the tax measures that funneled more resources to the health
sector.140
However, although the decrees were declared
unconstitutional, society’s response to the decrees showed how
important the right to health and the tutela were to Colombians.141
The Uribe government also paid a high political price for the
emergency decrees.142
Between 2008 and 2016 the court’s review/follow-up chamber
issued 213 follow-up orders. The chamber also organized public
hearings in which the court invited representatives of public
agencies, civil society and experts to present information on the
implementation of the judgment’s orders.143
Although this
monitoring process was designed to keep the Executive
accountable, the process had several weaknesses. While the court
convened voluntary independent experts (of which this author was
one), there remained a substantial lack of technical capacity that
made interpreting health data and other information difficult.144 In
addition, latent and at times open conflict –what one informant
referred to as a “Cold War”—between the court and the Executive
resulted in extensive, abstract and complicated reports delivered
by the Executive that were difficult for the court to understand,
and which made the monitoring process even more difficult.145
When President Juan Manuel Santos took office in August
2010, health system reform was one of the first issues on the
agenda.
However, according to Everaldo Lamprea, former
Auxiliary Magistrate of the court in charge of the follow-up unit
[https://perma.cc/SR5U-37HM] (holding that the declaratory decree of a state of
emergency relating to public health is unconstitutional).
140
Lamprea 2014, supra note 55, at 148.
141
Lamprea 2015, supra note 6, at 117 (describing the response of the
Colombian people and health professionals to the decrees and the Constitutional
Court ruling).
142
Young and Lemaitre, supra note 127, at 195 (detailing the political
aftereffects of the failed decrees on the Uribe government, such as the loss of the
2010 election).
143 Id. at 192.
144 Id. at 192.
145
Jorge I. Palacio, El Punto Ciego en el Derecho a la Salud Efectiva, Entre el
Simbolismo y la Evidencia Social (Presentation in Quibdo -Department of Chocoduring a visit of
the Constitutional Court)
(Jan.
31,
2015),
http://viva.org.co/attachments/article/271/Punto%20ciego%20salud%20%20Jorge%20Iv%C3%A1n%20Palacio.pdf [https://perma.cc/V58E-8KXW].
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during some of this time, even though the Santos administration
recognized issues critical to the efficiency and equity of the health
system, and passed legislation in Law 1438 that introduced
important reforms, such as pharmaceutical policy, priority setting,
and the significance of primary care, health promotion and
prevention, between 2010-2014 it was the review chamber,
composed of Jorge Ivan Palacio and two other justices, which most
dramatically influenced the government’s decision making
processes related to health.146
During these years, the review/follow-up chamber convened
two public hearings, in July 2011 and in May 2012. Lamprea
characterized these public hearings as spaces of authentic
deliberation that created substantial pressure on the government
for such issues as the pharmaceutical regulation.147
More broadly, some commentators have described these
hearings as potentially destabilizing mechanisms that prompted
the government to commit to public policies designed to comply
with the judgment’s orders.148 Others have noted that although the
court created forums that made it possible to express extremely
divergent opinions, there was no actual deliberation taking place—
merely the declaration of widely differing views in a relatively
“safe space.”149 Indeed, some view Cepeda’s original opinion
skeptically because it attempted to paste a deliberative process
onto a profoundly unequal, polarized and non-deliberative
society.150
Many agree on limits in practice even if they do not concur on
the responsibilities for those defects: the hearings have not been
open enough to guarantee the participation of the most vulnerable;
access to information has not been easy to obtain for the public or
even for many civil society organizations; and the criteria for

146
Lamprea 2015, supra note 6, at 100 (reviewing the initial decisions and
actions taken by Palacio regarding health matters following his accession to
office).
147 Id. at 121–122 (providing graphical representation and descriptions of the
pressure on various government officials following the two hearings); Lamprea
2014, supra note 55, at 150.
148
Interview with 060915A, Bogotá (June 9, 2015).
149
Interview with 061015B, Bogotá (June 10, 2015).
150 Id.
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participation in hearings, conferences, events and consultations has
not been clearly set.151
Yet, at the same time, commentators agree that the court did
spur the government to adopt the new statutory framework Law
on Health, which was passed by Congress in May 2014. The law
was reviewed and declared to be constitutional by the
Constitutional Court in judgment C-313/14 with important
revisions. In the decision, the court provided for greater deference
to physicians and limited the possibility of restriction on
treatments by administrative mechanisms and bodies. The court
also made clear that the system was going to be based on a
presumption of inclusions, and that the list of goods and services
excluded should be determined based on a participatory process,
as called for in the law.152 The court also insisted on aspects of
quality of care and asserted the need for integral care and the
continuity of care, maintaining that the obligation to provide
health services cannot be interrupted for any administrative or
economic reasons.153 Lamprea and García have argued that “Law
1751 and the Colombian Constitutional Court’s ruling C-324 are
good indicators that Colombian policymakers and judges are
trying to close the gap between formal and material health care
coverage. We are particularly optimistic about the convergence
between the right to health and health care coverage in Law
1751.”154
I disagree. In its best light, Justice Cepeda’s original opinion
can be read as an effort to catalyze a broader political discussion
about the collective construction of “no.”155 This approach in
contrast recreates the pitfalls of implicit rationing, based on
waiting lists and doctor discretion (which is greatly enhanced
under the statutory law), which will invariably favor the better off
Id.; Interview with 061215C, Bogotá (June 12, 2015).
See Yamin HRQ, supra note 7, at 6 (discussing the general guidance
provided in the General Comments, such as the emphasis on devising
participatory national plans for action).
153 See id., at 11 (describing the Colombian Court’s emphasis on establishing
fair process and equal access to health care).
154
Everaldo Lamprea & Johnattan García, Closing the Gap Between Formal and
Material Health Care Coverage in Colombia, 18(2) H. AND HUM. R. J. 49–65 (2016)
(discussing the gap between formal and material coverage).
155
Interview with 060915D, Bogotá (June 9, 2015).
151
152
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in Colombian society. By creating a list of exclusions, the statutory
law reproduces an already existing problem of “gray zones.”
Because everything is included unless it is explicitly excluded, the
law may turn out to substantially expand uncertainty around
covered services.156 Many agree that the executive branch’s efforts
to promote civic participation in defining the exclusions were not
adequate. Although the Ministry did surveys and media efforts, it
lacked a coherent methodology for deliberative participation. At
the end of the day, there is skepticism that the lack of process will
again lead people to distrust the definition of benefits package.157
The significance of the process to define the contours of the
updated POS, and in turn, the right to health cannot be overstated.
Although it may appear to be driven only by highly technical
considerations, priority setting reflects profound ethical and
normative judgments.158 If health is to be taken seriously as a right
in Colombia, the criteria to include or exclude goods and services
from the benefits packages must be made explicit, visible to the
public and be subject to justification by the political branches of
government.159 As Young and Lemaitre argue, it appears likely
that “[i]f the Colombian public does not understand the criteria
used to include and exclude certain treatments in the new POS,
and if the criteria for these decisions are not clear, people may very
well continue to seek redress in massive numbers through court
orders [tutelas], as the only mechanism through which to defend
their right to health.”160
Beginning in 2014, the court implemented a more dogmatic
approach to the monitoring process, demanding evidence of
compliance in particular cases that, from its point of view,
represent examples of weakness in the Ministry of Health’s
initiatives.161 The very specific orders with which the court
demanded compliance—such as conditions in a departmental
hospital—also arguably went beyond the original orders in T
Interview with 061015E, Bogotá (June 10, 2015).
Interview with 060915F, Bogotá (June 9, 2015); Interview with 061015C,
Bogotá (June 12, 2015); Interview with 060915G, Bogotá (June 9, 2015). Interview
with 060915A, Bogotá (June 9, 2015); see also Yamin HRQ, supra note 7.
158
Yamin HRQ, supra note 7, at 10; Yamin and Norheim HRQ, supra note 8.
159
Yamin HRQ, supra note 7, at 10.
160
Young and Lemaitre, supra note 127.
161
Interview with Jorge Ivan Palacio Palacio, Former president of the
Constitutional Court, Bogotá (June 11, 2015).
156
157
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760/08.162 Over this period of time, a noticeable shift in tutela
claims that went beyond the POS could be detected from access to
medicines and treatment, to tutelas claiming ancillary services,
including payments for caregivers.163 A lawyer involved in the
original opinion and the implementation of the case noted that the
follow-up had ceased to be “dialogical judicialism” when the court
got involved in such details rather than focusing on the original
opinion’s structural orders.164 At the same time, larger issues such
as criteria for participation in priority-setting and evaluations of
oversight and regulation seemed less front and center on the
Court’s agenda. The Ministry of Health reacted to this new more
dogmatic approach and adversarial tone with some resistance,
which was reflected in process of implementing the Statutory
Framework Law which went into effect in 2017.
Further, changes made to the statute of the Constitutional
Court after a political scandal make it difficult for a review
chamber to exercise ongoing review of a tutela in the same manner
as T 760/08 and T 025/04 had done before.165 For example, a 2015
case involving structural reform of prisons set up the civil society
follow-up unit, but did not place a follow-up unit within the court
itself.166 A 2017 judgment regarding health conditions in the very
deprived department of Vaupés, where the issue was public health
conditions and access to primary care, called for significant
structural changes, but notably established no follow-up unit.167 A
2018 case from the court even appeared to show the willingness on

162
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 16, 2015,
Auto 413/15 (Colom.).
163 See, e.g., Rodrigo Uprimny and Juanita Durán, Equidad y Protección
Judicial del Derecho a la Salud en Colombia, CEPAL - Serie Políticas Sociales N°
197 (Santiago, Chile: Naciones Unidas, 2014) 22–23.
164
Interview 060915D, supra note 156.
165
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 22, 2015, Acuerdo
02 de 2015 por medio del cual se Unifica y Actualiza el Reglamento de la Corte
Constitucional, (Colom.)
166
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia T-762/15,
Magistrada Ponente: Gloria Stella Ortiz., 16 de diciembre de 2015 (Colom.)
167
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia T-357/17,
Magistrada Ponente: Maria Stella Ortiz, 13 de julio de 2017 (Colom.) (containing a
note discussion justifying the use of tutela for a structural case due to figure of
Defensor del Pueblo as plaintiff on behalf of communities).
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the part of some justices to limit the use of the tutela.168 Finally, in
the wake of the new Statutory Framework Law, the turbulent postconflict situation Colombia faces, and the election of conservative
President Ivan Duque in 2018, the current justices in the Follow-Up
Chamber appear to be seeking criteria to close the T 760/08
judgment.
This experience of T 760/08 illustrates the importance of a
shared understanding of the conditions for meaningful dialogue on
grounds of rough equality, and of moving from an adversarial
posture to a collaborative one in the implementation of such a
systemic judgment. It further demonstrates the need for setting
explicit criteria, from the beginning, for both defining the
parameters of such a monitoring process, and under what
circumstances the court could consider follow up to be complete,
without capitulating to the political vicissitudes of the day.169 The
T 760/08 decision stretches the boundaries of judicial authority,
but even so reveals the limited capacity of even the most assertive
courts to transform the institutional arrangements necessary to
realize health rights in practice.
4. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
The experience of constitutionalization and judicialization of
the right to health in the region shows a number of lessons and
challenges. The setting of priorities to include within obligatory
social insurance schemes in the region is generally not done in a
systematic and transparent fashion that provides room for social
consultation and deliberation regarding the criteria for ranking
services and treatments. Rather, health systems are often plagued
by irrational rationing and implicit forms of allocating care—
through waiting lines, access to specialists, out-of-pocket
payments. In this context of poor responsiveness from the
executive and legislative branches of government, as well as
chronic regulatory failures within health systems, it is unsurprising

168
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], SU- 2018-N0005
(Unificando Jurisprudencia en relación del uso de Tutelas en T-60627321-6029416294392-6384059-6356241-6018806-6134961) 13 de febrero de 2018 (Colom.).
169
Yamin HRQ, supra note 7.
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that people take advantage of the favorable opportunity structures
that exist in many courts.
Structural reforms in constitutions have been as important as
the enumeration of specific rights relating to health in constitutions
across the region in producing the rise in judicialization.
Individual exploitation of opportunities within systems has
exploded, using constitutional litigation as an avenue, while
broader collective efforts to reform the health systems through
litigation are far less frequent. Such individual litigation for
entitlements, while often better understood as regulatory gap
problems, can challenge principles of formal equality by fostering
queue-jumping for expensive medications and treatments by those
with better access to justice. It also may distort health systems
toward curative care, rather than investing in long-term structural
infrastructure for the health system and in preconditions for health,
which have wider benefits for the disadvantaged.
In response to the massive judicialization in health, as well as
to other systemic and structural problems, some courts in the
region, including those in Argentina and Colombia, have issued
broad structural remedies. These judgments need not be seen as
isolated from social struggles.170
Indeed, Judgment T-760/08 led not just to a new Statutory Law
on Health, but also to the reframing of the discourse around the
health system and crisis in Colombia.171 After the T-760/08
Judgment, civil society groups were quick to appropriate the
definition of health as a fundamental right, which led to the
origination of social organizations, academia, and NGOs focused
on activities around the statutory law.172 However, the actual
participation in redefinitions of the benefits scheme, or exclusions
therein, or of new health policies, has been limited.173 Meaningful
170
Rodrigo Uprimny, La Judicialización de la Política en Colombia: Casos,
Potencialidades y Riesgos, 6 SUR: REVISTA INT´L. DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 53–69 (2007)
(discussing the intensification of the judicialization in Colombia).
171 See Rodríguez-Garavito 2014, supra note 60; see also Cesar RodríguezGaravito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic
Rights in Latin America, 89(7) TEXAS L. REVIEW 1669–1698 (2011) (discussing the
impact of judicial activism in high court decisions, like T-760/08).
172
Young and Lemaitre, supra note 127, at 197.
173
Interviews with 061015B, 060915A, 061015C, 060915F, 060915D, Bogotá
(June 9–12, 2015).
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dialogue in a sector as rife with asymmetries of power and
technical
information
poses
particular
challenges
to
democratization through dialogue. Similarly, the backdrop of a
deeply polarized society and non-representative government,
which may be particularly acute in Colombia but is similarly
present in other countries, poses a stark challenge to the necessary
limit-setting process that fair-minded deliberation should foster.
Ultimately, health is a very sensitive reflection of social justice,
and health systems are intimately connected to the degrees of
social solidarity and democracy that exist in countries. Thus, even
the most progressive and innovative of courts can only offer feeble
alternatives to more robust egalitarian aspirations. Just as Garcia
Villegas and Uprimny have argued generally that “constitutional
justice can become an important tool for democratic progress, as
long as it is part of broader social struggles,” so too may be said of
health justice in particular. 174

174
Rodrigo Uprimny & Mauricio García-Villegas, The Enforcement of Social
Rights by the Colombian Constitutional Court: Cases and Debates, in COURTS AND
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